Autore: Karamanolis, George
Titolo: The Primacy of Virtue. Versions of an Idea in De finibus V and Tusculunae Disputationes V
Rivista/Miscellanea: in: G. E. Müller-J. Müller (ed.), Cicero Ethicus, Philosophia Romana Reihe
Luogo edizione: Basel
Editore: Schwabe
Anno edizione: 2020
Pagine: 1-23
Parole chiave: Philosophie - Filosofia - Philosophy, Sources - Fonti - Sources
Descrizione: [Abstract] In this paper I set out to show that Cicero continues in Tusculanae Disputationes 5 the enquiry regarding the role of virtue in attaining happiness which he had carried out in De finibus. While in De finibus Cicero finally suspends judgment as to which position about virtue’s role in attaining happiness should be preferred, in Tusc. Disp. 5 he decides to side with the Stoics on that matter. Cicero, however, I argue, does not adopt the Stoic point of view, but rather he agrees with a position that he traces back to Socrates, in dialogues such as the Euthydemus or the Meno. What is more, Cicero distinguishes himself from the Stoics in that he operates in ethics as an academic sceptic; he scrutinizes the various positions of the contemporary philosophical schools and when this leads him to aporia, he resumes inquiry taking aporia as a new starting point. Seeking a way out of the aporia, Cicero is prepared to revise his views and side with what he finds most convincing (probabile). In this regard Cicero remains faithful to academic scepticism, which he considers to be inspired by Socrates.
Opere:
Link: https://www.academia.edu/35324524/The_Primacy_of_Virtue_Versions_of_an_Idea_in_De_finibus_V_and_Tusculunae_Disputationes_V_in_G_E_M%C3%BCller_J_M%C3%BCller_ed_Cicero_Ethicus_Schwabe_2020_Philosophia_R
Sigla autore: Karamanolis 2020
Titolo: The Primacy of Virtue. Versions of an Idea in De finibus V and Tusculunae Disputationes V
Rivista/Miscellanea: in: G. E. Müller-J. Müller (ed.), Cicero Ethicus, Philosophia Romana Reihe
Luogo edizione: Basel
Editore: Schwabe
Anno edizione: 2020
Pagine: 1-23
Parole chiave: Philosophie - Filosofia - Philosophy, Sources - Fonti - Sources
Descrizione: [Abstract] In this paper I set out to show that Cicero continues in Tusculanae Disputationes 5 the enquiry regarding the role of virtue in attaining happiness which he had carried out in De finibus. While in De finibus Cicero finally suspends judgment as to which position about virtue’s role in attaining happiness should be preferred, in Tusc. Disp. 5 he decides to side with the Stoics on that matter. Cicero, however, I argue, does not adopt the Stoic point of view, but rather he agrees with a position that he traces back to Socrates, in dialogues such as the Euthydemus or the Meno. What is more, Cicero distinguishes himself from the Stoics in that he operates in ethics as an academic sceptic; he scrutinizes the various positions of the contemporary philosophical schools and when this leads him to aporia, he resumes inquiry taking aporia as a new starting point. Seeking a way out of the aporia, Cicero is prepared to revise his views and side with what he finds most convincing (probabile). In this regard Cicero remains faithful to academic scepticism, which he considers to be inspired by Socrates.
Opere:
Link: https://www.academia.edu/35324524/The_Primacy_of_Virtue_Versions_of_an_Idea_in_De_finibus_V_and_Tusculunae_Disputationes_V_in_G_E_M%C3%BCller_J_M%C3%BCller_ed_Cicero_Ethicus_Schwabe_2020_Philosophia_R
Sigla autore: Karamanolis 2020
