Auteur: Thorsrud, Harald
Titre: Cicero on his Academic Predecessors: the Fallibilism of Arcesilaus and Carneades
Revue/Collection: Journal of the History of Philosophy - Volume 40, Number 1
Annèe edition: 2002
Pages: 1-18
Mots-clès: Philosophie - Filosofia - Philosophy
Description: [Abstract] In an important paper, Couissin argued for what has come to be called the dialectical interpretation of Academic skepticism. On this interpretation, Arcesilaus and Carneades practiced the same, purely dialectical method -- they would elicit assent to premises characteristic of their interlocutor's position and then derive unacceptable consequences exclusively on the basis of those premises. This method allowed them to remain uncommitted to the premises as well as the conclusions of their arguments. They would simply draw logical consequences from their opponents' own premises for the sake of refutation. This is in keeping with the current consensus that an ancient skeptic is one who has no beliefs, or at least no beliefs of a problematically dogmatic sort. Consequently, the methods of ancient skeptics, including Academic skeptics, are thought to be strictly negative, seeking only the elimination of belief. So when we come to Cicero's Philonian version of Academic methodology and find that it explicitly includes provisions for the acquisition of fallible beliefs, it is no surprise that commentators who are sympathetic to the dialectical interpretation tend to view...
Sigle auteur: Thorsrud 2002
Titre: Cicero on his Academic Predecessors: the Fallibilism of Arcesilaus and Carneades
Revue/Collection: Journal of the History of Philosophy - Volume 40, Number 1
Annèe edition: 2002
Pages: 1-18
Mots-clès: Philosophie - Filosofia - Philosophy
Description: [Abstract] In an important paper, Couissin argued for what has come to be called the dialectical interpretation of Academic skepticism. On this interpretation, Arcesilaus and Carneades practiced the same, purely dialectical method -- they would elicit assent to premises characteristic of their interlocutor's position and then derive unacceptable consequences exclusively on the basis of those premises. This method allowed them to remain uncommitted to the premises as well as the conclusions of their arguments. They would simply draw logical consequences from their opponents' own premises for the sake of refutation. This is in keeping with the current consensus that an ancient skeptic is one who has no beliefs, or at least no beliefs of a problematically dogmatic sort. Consequently, the methods of ancient skeptics, including Academic skeptics, are thought to be strictly negative, seeking only the elimination of belief. So when we come to Cicero's Philonian version of Academic methodology and find that it explicitly includes provisions for the acquisition of fallible beliefs, it is no surprise that commentators who are sympathetic to the dialectical interpretation tend to view...
Sigle auteur: Thorsrud 2002
