Auteur: Wynne, J. P. F.
Titre: Cicero on the soul’s sensation of itself: Tusculanæ 1.49-76
Revue/Collection: In: Brad Inwood & James Warren (éds.), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020,
Annèe edition: 2020
Pages: 199-230
Mots-clès: Philosophie - Filosofia - Philosophy
Description: In the first book of his Tusculanæ Disputationes, Cicero gives two arguments that the soul is eternal. Specifically, he concludes that each human soul’s rational part or “mind” (mens) neither came to be nor will perish. I shall argue that in pursuit of this conclusion, Cicero constructs the position that, at least in this life, the human mind does not “sense” itself, but knows about itself only by inference from its “sensations” of other objects. First, the question of the mind’s sensation of itself is comparable to current debates about consciousness, for example to questions relating to the “hard problem” of consciousness. [Wynne]
Oeuvres:
Sigle auteur: Wynne 2020
Titre: Cicero on the soul’s sensation of itself: Tusculanæ 1.49-76
Revue/Collection: In: Brad Inwood & James Warren (éds.), Body and Soul in Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020,
Annèe edition: 2020
Pages: 199-230
Mots-clès: Philosophie - Filosofia - Philosophy
Description: In the first book of his Tusculanæ Disputationes, Cicero gives two arguments that the soul is eternal. Specifically, he concludes that each human soul’s rational part or “mind” (mens) neither came to be nor will perish. I shall argue that in pursuit of this conclusion, Cicero constructs the position that, at least in this life, the human mind does not “sense” itself, but knows about itself only by inference from its “sensations” of other objects. First, the question of the mind’s sensation of itself is comparable to current debates about consciousness, for example to questions relating to the “hard problem” of consciousness. [Wynne]
Oeuvres:
Sigle auteur: Wynne 2020
